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In 1992 the world woke up to find that the Soviet Union was no longer on the map. One of 
the world’s two superpowers had collapsed without a war, alien invasion or any other 
catastrophe, with the exception of one rather farcical and unsuccessful coup. And the 
collapse happened against all expectations that the Soviet empire was too big to fail, too 
stable to collapse and had survived too much turbulence simply to implode. True, there was 
strong evidence to suggest that the Soviet system had been in irreversible decline since the 
1970s, but this was anticipated to unfold over decades; nothing preordained its collapse as 
the climax of a ‘short 20th century’. 
In 1985, 1986 and even in 1989, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was as inconceivable to 
contemporary analysts as the prospect of the European Union’s disintegration is to experts 
today. As late as 1990 a group of outstanding American experts closely connected to the 
Pentagon were convinced that  
it is improbable that by the end of this decade the Soviet Union will be a welfare state 
on the Scandinavian model and a well-functioning parliamentary democracy. Yet a 
total breakdown is almost equally unlikely in the near future. Sensationalist scenarios 
make for exciting reading but…in the real world various stabilizers and retarding 
factors exist; societies frequently undergo crises, even grave and dangerous crises. 
They seldom commit suicide.1 
But what a difference a decade can make! An outcome that was perceived as unthinkable in 
1985 was declared inevitable in 1995. The failure of imagination was presented as historical 
necessity. And it is exactly this twist of fate, this leap from the ‘unthinkable’ to the 
‘inevitable’ that makes the Soviet disintegration experience a useful reference point in 
current discussions on the ramifications of the European crisis and the choices that European 
leaders face.  
After all, the EU’s present crisis has powerfully demonstrated that the risk of disintegration 
of the EU is much more than a rhetorical device – a toy monster used by scared politicians to 
enforce austerity on unhappy voters. It is not only European economies but also European 
politics that are in turmoil. Europe finds itself squeezed between the impotence of national 
politics, the democratic deficit of European policies and the growing mistrust of the markets. 
                                                   
1 Walter Laqueur (ed.), Soviet Union 2000: Reform or Revolution, New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1990, 
p. xi. 
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The financial crisis has sharply reduced the life expectancy of governments, regardless of 
their political colour, and opened space for the rise of populist and protest parties. The 
public mood is best described as a combination of pessimism and anger, as eloquently 
evoked by poet William Butler Yeats in “The Second Coming”:  
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;… / 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity. 
This mood is reflected in recent surveys. For example, the “Future of Europe” survey, 
funded by the European Commission and published in April 2012,2 shows that while the 
majority of Europeans agree that the EU is a good place to live in, their confidence in the 
economic performance of the Union and its capacity to play a major role in global politics 
has declined. Even more troubling, almost 90% of Europeans see a big gap between what the 
public wants and what governments do; only a third of Europeans feel that their vote counts 
at an EU level, and only 18% of Italians and 15% of Greeks consider that their vote counts 
even in their own country. And according to the latest Transatlantic Trends poll, 76% of 
Europeans find their economic system unfair and delivering only to the very few at the top.3 
In short, the European Union, as we know it, no longer exists. The very foundations on 
which it was built are eroding. Shared memories of the Second World War have faded away 
– half the 15- and 16-year-olds in German high schools do not know that Hitler was a 
dictator, while a third believe that he protected human rights.4 The collapse of the Soviet 
Union has stripped away the geopolitical rationale for European unity. The democratic 
welfare state that was at the heart of the post-war political consensus is under siege by, 
among other things, sheer demographics. And the prosperity that bolstered the European 
project’s political legitimacy is vanishing. More than six out of ten Europeans believe that the 
lives of today’s children will be more difficult than those of people from their own 
generation.5  
Against this background, how unthinkable is the EU’s disintegration? Should Europeans 
make the mistake of taking the Union for granted? Should they assume that the Union 
would not collapse because it should not collapse? Here, Europe’s capacity to learn from the 
Soviet precedent could play a crucial part. For the very survival of the EU may depend on its 
leaders’ ability to manage a similar mix of political, economic and psychological factors that 
were in play in the process of the Soviet collapse. The game of disintegration is primarily a 
political one driven much more by the perceptions and misperceptions of the political actors 
than simply by the constellation of the structural factors – institutional and economic. 
At the same time, deciding to compare the current EU crisis with the Soviet collapse does not 
mean that we accept that the EU is doomed to disintegrate. The intention of this comparison 
is to kill misplaced illusions and not to fuel apocalyptic fears. It is fair to state the obvious 
that the European Union is not the Soviet Union. The Soviet order “collapsed like a house of 
cards”, wrote the eminent historian Martin Malia, “because it had always been a house of 
                                                   
2 European Commission, Future of Europe, Special Eurobarometer 379, Brussels, April 2012 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_379_en.pdf). 
3 Transatlantic Trends 2012 is an annual survey of US and European public opinion. Polling was 
conducted by TNS Opinion between June 2 and June 27 2012, in the US, Turkey and Russia (surveyed 
for the first time) and 12 European Union member states (http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-
trends/). 
4 Barbara Ellen, “We had that Mr Hitler in history again, Mum…”, Guardian, 1 July 2012 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jul/01/barbara-ellen-german-kids-nazism). 
5  European Commission, Future of Europe (2012), op. cit. 
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cards”.6 In its last years the ideological appeal of the regime had long been dead, and its 
capacity to deliver economic growth had been exhausted. In 1990, among all the consumer 
goods in the Soviet Union only 11% could be found easily in the shops, the other 89% were 
consumer goods in shortage.7 So Soviet order was paralysed by the deadly combination of 
political stability and economic inefficiency. 
The EU is not a house of cards, and the great differences between the Soviet and the EU 
projects must always be kept in mind if we want to make use of the lessons of the Soviet 
collapse. While the EU is an unfinished project, the Soviet Union was a flawed project. While 
the Soviet project was based on terror, the European project was built on consensus. While 
the majority of Soviet citizens were attracted by the life in the West, Europeans are proud of 
their way of life and their political model and do not dream ‘Chinese dreams’. If the collapse 
of the Soviet Union was preconditioned on the collapse of the communist ideology, the EU is 
not suffering a major crisis of its worldview. If Soviet reformers saw the future of the Soviet 
Union in a looser federation or confederation, the EU’s survival is preconditioned on a closer 
political union. In short, the Soviet Union fell victim to its failures while the EU is threatened 
by its very success. But while the fundamentally different nature of the European project is a 
strong argument for why Europe will not go the Soviet way, it is not a sufficient guarantee 
that its collapse is impossible. For the EU to survive, European leaders should avoid the 
mistakes that the Soviet leaders made. 
The Soviet Union passed into history not because of any conspiracy of the West and not only 
because of the structural defects of the communist system, but also because of decisions 
taken and not taken at the time of the crisis. Now reading the memoirs by some of the major 
protagonists of the disintegration drama, one is left with the feeling that for some of the 
Soviet leaders, including Mikhail Gorbachev, the collapse of the Soviet Union came as such a 
surprise that long after the Soviet empire had been dead and buried they were still not ready 
to believe in its disappearance. Yet it can be observed that Gorbachev’s reluctance to 
introduce direct elections for the Soviet presidency could have been as crucial for the 
survival of the Soviet Union as the historically low prices of oil on international markets. 
What makes the Soviet disintegration experience particularly challenging for the observers 
of the current European crisis is that in the case of the EU it is even difficult to grasp what 
‘the collapse of the Union’ would mean. In the case of the Soviet Union, collapse meant that a 
state disappeared from the map and a dozen new states came into being across a vast 
territory from northern and Central Asia to south-eastern Europe. But the EU is not a state, 
and even if it collapses nothing would change on the map. Moreover, even if the EU 
disintegrates, most (if not all) of the member states would remain market democracies and a 
certain level of cooperation and common institutions would be preserved. 
So, how can its disintegration be defined or conceptualised? How can it be distinguished 
from reform or reconfiguration of the Union? Would the departure of at least one country 
from the eurozone, or from the Union itself, amount to ‘disintegration’? Or would other 
trends be enough of an indicator: the decline of the EU’s global influence or the reversal of 
some major achievements of European integration (such as the free movement of people or 
the abolition of institutions like the Court of Justice of the European Union)? Does the 
emergence of a two-tier EU equal disintegration or is it just a step towards a closer and more 
perfect union?  
                                                   
6 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991, New York, NY: Free 
Press, 2008. 
7 Egor Gaĭdar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2007. 
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In answering these questions, the Soviet experience offers some useful lessons. These are 
lessons not so much at the level of policies but at the level of the politics of crisis 
management. 
The first lesson is also a paradox: namely, the belief (backed by economists and shared by 
Europe’s political classes) that the Union cannot disintegrate is also one of the major risks of 
disintegration. The last years of the Soviet Union are the classic manifestation of this 
dynamic. The perception that disintegration is ‘unthinkable’ could tempt policy-makers to 
embrace anti-EU policies or rhetoric for short-term advantage, in the belief that ‘nothing 
really bad can happen’ in the long term. The belief that disintegration is a highly unlikely 
scenario leads policy-makers to underestimate the time factor when it comes to the survival 
of the Union. ‘Too little, too late’ is an appealing title for any history of the Soviet collapse. It 
could be also a title for Europe’s unwanted failure. One of the risk factors in the current 
European crisis is that the democratic nature of the EU member states prescribes that the 
‘political timing’ of the solution is perceived in strictly national terms and is determined by 
the national electoral cycles, while the markets refuse to follow the political logic of the 
member states and tend to put a premium risk on Europe’s sensitivity to national time 
tables. At the moment Europe is united by the pressure of the markets and divided by the 
pressure of the voters. And it is up to the political elites to manage these two pressures. 
Moreover, assessment of the disintegration risk should not be left to economists, who have a 
blind spot when it comes to collapse. In the view of the leading American economist Fred 
Bergsten, “given how much is at stake, Europe will almost certainly complete the original 
concept of a comprehensive economic and monetary union”.8 It can be hoped that he is right 
but the Soviet case suggests that the very high economic costs of disintegration is not a 
reason that would prevent it from happening. In this sense, believing that the EU cannot 
disintegrate simply because it would be costly is weak reassurance for the stability of the 
Union. In times of crisis, ‘the logic of politics’ as a rule takes precedent over ‘the logic of the 
economists’.  
The real challenge of the current crisis is that at a certain moment European leaders could be 
forced to choose between saving the euro and saving the EU. While it is quite obvious that 
the breakup of the euro could result in the dismantling of the European project, what is less 
discussed but not unlikely is that ‘saving the euro’ could come at the cost of democracy in 
the countries on the periphery. Such a development could fundamentally change the nature 
of the European project. While the dictates of virtuous creditor countries to sinful debtor 
countries look like a solution to many economists, for political analysts they loom as a source 
of a future crisis.9  
The second lesson is that the EU’s disintegration does not need to be a result of a victory by 
anti-EU forces over pro-EU forces; the Soviet experience is a potent warning to Europe that 
collapse can occur and if it happens it would be the unintended consequence of the Union’s 
long-term dysfunctioning (or perceived dysfunctioning), compounded by the elites’ 
misreading of national political dynamics. While at present political leaders tend to be 
preoccupied with the dynamics of the pro-EU and anti-EU sentiments of the public, and 
commentators celebrate any national election in which a populist party does not end up in 
government, the dirty secret is that the cost of neutralising the populist pressure is that many 
mainstream parties in Europe have started to speak and act as populists. And the fact that in 
                                                   
8 C. Fred Bergsten, “Why the Euro Will Survive: Completing the Continent’s Half-Built House”, 
Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2012. 
9 George Soros, “The Tragedy of the European Union and How to Resolve It”, New York Review of 
Books, 27 September 2012.  
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the current European crisis (unlike the Soviet one) there is not any popular alternative to the 
EU does not alter the risk of disintegration dynamics. It is true that the great majority of 
European citizens (with the exception of the British), even when disappointed with the EU 
do not dream of returning to the time of a Europe of nation states. But the lack of an 
attractive alternative is not a guarantee against disintegration. Another of the risk factors in 
the current European crisis is that while the EU does not have an alternative, the populist 
waves coming from the south and north have different targets and make common politics 
very difficult. The angry voters in the south oppose the austerity policies advocated by the 
north, but they are ready to endorse political union because they totally mistrust their 
national governments and have lost hope in their national democracies. At the same time, 
the populist movements in the north are supportive of austerity policies but they oppose 
common political institutions because their trust in their national democracies is much 
higher than their trust in Brussels. So, it is not so much the rise of anti-European populism, 
but more the clash between the anti-austerity populism of the south and the anti-Brussels 
populism of the north that could destroy the Union. 
The third lesson of the Soviet Union’s demise is that misguided reforms – even more than 
the lack of reforms – can result in disintegration. It is during crises that politicians search for 
a ‘silver bullet’, and quite often it is this bullet that is the cause of death. A central factor in 
the end of the Soviet system was Mikhail Gorbachev’s failure to grasp its nature (by 
persisting in the illusion that it could be preserved without complete reform, and his 
misguided belief in its superiority). It was Gorbachev’s conviction that the Soviet party-state 
could survive the loss of its ideological legitimacy and the organisational disintegration of 
the Communist Party that to a greater extent doomed his efforts to save and reform the 
Soviet Union. In this context it is curious to reflect on the contrasting ways in which the 
Soviet and the Chinese leaders read the failures of the communist experiment. While Soviet 
reformers who came from the ranks of the liberal intelligentsia tended to believe that what 
was still valuable in socialism were the socialist ideas, Chinese reformers were eager to 
dismiss socialist ideology while doing their best to keep the organisational power of the 
Communist Party, realising its usefulness in keeping the country together. 
The risk of misguided reforms is also hidden in the temptation of leaders to use the crisis as 
an opportunity to do what they always wanted to do but what they knew the people would 
oppose. The federalists’ drive for radical solutions is as much the result of the logic of the 
crisis and the need to complete the project started with the introduction of the common 
currency as an attempt to seize the moment and to compensate for the absence of popular 
backing for the idea of a federalist Europe. But the crisis cannot be a substitute for public 
consent and the failure of the Soviet reforms is the best illustration. 
The fourth lesson of the Soviet experience is that the major risk to the political project – in the 
absence of war or other extreme circumstances – comes not from destabilisation on the 
periphery but from a revolt at the centre (even if the crisis on the periphery can be 
infectious). It was Russia’s choice to get rid of the union rather than the Baltic republics’ 
ever-present desire to run away from it that determined the fate of the Soviet state. 
Today, it is Germany’s view of what is happening in the European Union that will more 
decisively affect the future of the European project than the troubles in the Greek or Spanish 
economies. When the ‘winners’ of integration start to view themselves as its major victims, 
then it is certain that big trouble is imminent. This is why it is critically important to get a 
correct reading of Germany in order to understand the risks of disintegration. In this respect 
the parallel between Russia’s role in the context of the Soviet collapse and Germany’s role in 
the context of the European crisis is of little help. Russia in the course of the Soviet collapse 
was a strange actor: it had a legitimate leader – Boris Yeltsin, elected in direct elections – but 
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Russia was the shadow of the Soviet state. In a way, for Russia to be born the Soviet Union 
had to die. This is not the case with Germany. 
Germany has emerged in this crisis not simply as Europe’s uber power but also as 
synonymous with the Europe that works. Contrary to the media noise, Europeans do not 
have reasons to doubt Germany’s devotion to the EU. What could and should be questioned 
is Germany’s strategy for reordering the EU and the chances of this strategy succeeding. So 
the answer to the question of whether the EU can survive depends on the answer to the 
question of whether Germany’s strategy of transforming ‘Solidarity Europe’ into a ‘Europe 
of Rules’ will succeed. 
Berlin’s leadership is also challenged by the way Germany so far has experienced the current 
crisis. The paradox is that Europe is in crisis and the most powerful European state, 
Germany (unlike Russia in the context of the Soviet collapse), is not in crisis; moreover, it is 
the major beneficiary of the European crisis. Its government bonds are refinanced at zero 
interest rates. Its unemployment has declined to a record low. The crisis has resulted in the 
inflow of skilled labour from countries like Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, thus reducing 
the demographic fears of the German public. Germany’s global standing has increased. 
Thus, Germany has all the reasons to both fear the crisis and love it. Berlin is not in a hurry 
to curb the crisis, first because it enjoys it and second because any quick fix will put at risk 
Germany’s efforts to transform the Union.  
In a way, this crisis is probably Germany’s last hope to create a Europe of Rules. And this is 
even more important keeping in mind that Germany, like other rich and ageing countries, 
faces enormous long-term challenges. Its workforce is shrinking, its energy sector needs to be 
remade, and its infrastructure has gone too long without improvement. In the last decade, 
net investment in Germany as a share of GDP has been lower than at any time in recorded 
history, outside the years of the Great Depression. Income inequality in Germany in this last 
decade has increased twice as rapidly as the OECD average.10 
It is a common theme in the current debate that the history of Germany’s imperial ambitions 
in Europe could be factor in resistance to Berlin’s transformation strategy. What is less 
discussed is that the nature of the German reform experience could also be a risk factor and 
hinder efforts to overcome the crisis. In the way that Russia’s institutional weakness made 
disintegration the only viable option for building Russian statehood, it is Germany’s reform 
experience that predetermines Berlin’s choices.  
Germany’s responses to the crisis are usually traced back to its Weimar experience with 
inflation (explaining its obsession with price stability), the demographic profile of Germany’s 
voters (older and afraid of losing their savings) and the intellectual tradition of German 
ordnung liberalism that puts its trust in independent institutions like the Constitutional Court 
and Bundesbank.11 Germany’s experiences with reunification (generosity is not enough) and 
the last decade of reform (structural reforms work) are also usually mentioned when we try 
to understand what Germany thinks. But the least studied source of Germany’s 
transformation strategy is Germany’s reading of the experience of Central and Eastern 
Europe in the transition period. In our view, Germany’s outlook on how Europe can be 
transformed is very much rooted in the experience of these countries. It was in Central and 
Eastern Europe where German policy-makers were convinced that one can have painful 
economic reforms amounting to the dismantling of the welfare state that need not provoke a 
                                                   
10 Adam Tooze, “Germany’s Unsustainable Growth: Austerity Now, Stagnation Later”, Foreign Affairs, 
September/October, 2012. 
11 Ulrike Guérot and Mark Leonard, The New German Question: How Europe Can Get the Germany it 
Needs, ECFR Policy Brief, European Council of Foreign Relations, London, April 2011 (www.ecfr.eu). 
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populist backlash. The Germans were convinced that outside intervention can result not so 
much in the de-legitimation of the national democratic institutions but in their 
strengthening. So Germany’s reform agenda can be summarised as ‘doing in the south what 
we succeeded to do in the east’ – fostering fiscally responsible member states. The Central 
and Eastern European experience does not explain why Germany wants what it wants, but 
does explain why Berlin believes that its strategy will work. 
Germany has strong arguments to believe that its transformation strategy can work outside 
Germany and even outside northern Europe. The post-revolutionary recession in most of 
Central and Eastern Europe was deeper and more painful than that experienced by southern 
Europe today. The restructuring to be undertaken was much more radical than that expected 
from Greece or Spain. The institutions in Central and Eastern Europe were weaker than 
those in the south today. And the risks of political instability and violence were higher.  
At the same time, there are a number of factors that make ‘transforming the south in the 
manner of the east’ a very risky strategy. The success of the Central and Eastern European 
transitions to the extent they are a success (with Hungary being a demonstration that this 
success is not absolute or irreversible) were preconditioned on several factors that are absent 
in the current context. In the East there was a strong negative consensus with respect to the 
past, there was optimism about the future and the younger generations were the perceived 
winners. In the south, the past is something to be preserved, the outlook is pessimistic and 
youth are the major losers. At the time of the Central and Eastern European transitions, there 
was a lot of certainty about what should be done and the West was the model most Central 
and Eastern Europeans were eager to follow, while today the crisis of the EU is part of a 
bigger crisis of capitalism and liberal democracy, as we know them. The transitions there 
were accompanied by the emergence of the new elites and people had the sense of victory, 
which is not the case now.   
In short, the hope that southern Europe can be transformed on the model of Central and 
Eastern Europe could turn out to be the weak spot in Berlin’s strategy to reorder the 
European Union.  
The fifth lesson is that if the dynamic of disintegration prevails, the result will look more like 
a ‘bank run’ than a populist revolution against the Union. Thus, the most important factor 
affecting the chances of the Union surviving is the trust of the elites in the capacity of the 
Union to deal with its problems. In Stephen Kotkin’s apt observation on the Soviet case, “it 
was the central elite, rather than the independence movements of the periphery, that 
cashiered the Union”.12 
Whereas people can be unhappy about Europe without revolting against it, national elites 
could abandon it from fear of losing control – and even at the moment they start questioning 
its prospects, their actions (by inciting general panic among those who fear they will be the 
last to ask for their money, as in bank runs) can contribute to its eventual collapse. 
Paradoxically, the EU is an elite project sustained by the European elites’ respect for 
democracy. Today it is also an elite project endangered by the elites’ fear of democracy. 
Unable to bring democracy to the European level owing to the lack of a European demos and 
frightened by the spectre of anti-European populism at the national level, many European 
politicians are ready pre-emptively to turn their backs on the Union. 
For the first time since the European project was set in motion after 1945, the objectives of 
‘ever closer union’ and ‘deeper democracy’ are at odds. At present, a political union capable 
of backing the euro with a common fiscal policy cannot be achieved as long as EU member 
                                                   
12 Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 107. 
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states remain fully democratic, for their citizens will not support it. On the other hand, the 
breakup of the common currency could lead to the breakup of the Union, and there is also a 
risk of a domestic democratic breakdown in some countries in the east and south, especially 
Hungary, Romania and Greece. Thus, contrary to the expectations of some democratic 
theorists, the EU will not collapse because of the ‘democratic deficit’ of European 
institutions. Nor will it be saved by the democratic mobilisation of civil society. Rather, it is 
widespread disillusionment with democracy – the shared belief that national governments 
are powerless in the face of global markets – that may be the best hope for reconciling the 
growing tension between the goal of further European integration and the goal of deepening 
democracy in Europe.  
Yet it would be unwise to expect that such ‘democratic exhaustion’ would be enough to save 
the European project. For the nature of the disillusionment with democracy differs 
substantially across the continent, especially between the fiscally sound north (Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria and Finland) and the indebted south (Italy, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal). Disillusionment with politics in societies on the southern periphery may diminish 
their reluctance to delegate more powers to the European centre, but it will not prevent a 
political backlash against austerity policies imposed by the north. Moreover, the continuing 
trust in national democratic institutions on the part of voters in northern European will 
probably make them unwilling to accept political union. This is why a ‘bank run’, not on 
banks but on the very idea of the EU, could be one of the scenarios for the collapse of the 
Union. 
The sixth lesson of the disintegration is that the hope of a small but more functional and 
optimal union and orderly break-up of the eurozone may itself open the way to 
disintegration. In this context it is interesting to look at the political logic of the break-up of 
the rouble zone and how it enlightens our discussion on the possibility and desirability of 
the break-up of the eurozone. The nature of the Soviet command economy, the low level of 
sophistication of this economy, the institutional weaknesses of the post-Soviet republics and 
the fact that the Soviet Union was very much organised not around the idea of the common 
market but around the cross-border integration of the production lines make any 
comparison between the current dilemmas of the eurozone and the experience of the break-
up of the rouble zone not an easy one. It is fair to admit that if the eurozone breaks up, its 
disintegration will not bear much resemblance to the process of currency proliferation in the 
post-Soviet space. Some conclusions are still possible, however. 
In his analysis of the break-up of the rouble zone, Patrick Conway has observed that 
“countries will choose to leave a currency area for three reasons: 1) nationalism, 2) a desire to 
isolate against monetary shocks originating in the economies of other members and 3) a 
desire to increase national control over the collection of seigniorage.”13 This same logic is 
true for the eurozone. In the case of the Soviet collapse, the Baltic republics were the only 
ones to leave the currency area because of nationalism and it is not by accident that their exit 
was the least painful one. The others were forced to leave either because of fear of external 
shocks or for desire of seigniorage, and their exit was much more painful. In the case of exit 
from the eurozone, nationalism will not be a primary motivation for any of the member 
countries. So, it is more relevant to look at how the break-up worked in the non-Baltic 
countries. In the context of this experience, the break-up of the rouble zone warns against the 
rational expectations of a possibility of benevolent and orderly exit from the common 
currency. As the historian Harold James has argued, “an exit like this is messy and leads to 
                                                   
13 Patrick Conway, “Currency Proliferation: The Monetary Legacy of the Soviet Union”, Essays in 
International Finance 197, Princeton University, June 1995. 
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loss of income and inflation”. 14 The other warning is that the survival of monetary union in 
the case of political disintegration is also unlikely. When in 1991, the presidents of Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine decided to put an end to the Soviet Union, they still hoped that they 
could preserve the common currency while governing independent states, but in just the 
next two years it became obvious that a common currency could not survive in the situation 
of high inflation and broken political bonds. Russia’s effort to curb hyperinflation and make 
a transition to a market economy was endangered by the pro-inflation policies of the other 
republics. So, the logic of market reforms clashed with the desire to keep the rouble zone 
intact, and the common currency was dead.  
So when political commentators today speculate about the feasibility and desirability of a 
‘northern euro’ or a ‘southern euro’, they should remember that the summit of leaders from 
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine that marked the end of the Soviet Union was thought to be not a 
funeral but a birth of a more optimal and functional union among less diverse and more like-
minded member states. But what was thought to be a beginning has been remembered as an 
end, because when the process of disintegration starts it never stops half way. So, it is fair to 
observe that the pursuit of a more cohesive EU composed of less diverse members could lead 
to disintegration at a time when both the political elites and the public are unhappy with the 
present status quo and are simultaneously scared of the collapse of the Union and the 
prospect of global irrelevance in the future. 
The seventh and most disturbing lesson coming out of a study of Soviet collapse is that at 
times of threats of disintegration political actors should bet on flexibility and constrain their 
natural urge for rigidity and solutions intended to last (which, if and when they fail, can 
accelerate the momentum of disintegration). Unfortunately, at present, European decision-
makers are trying to save the Union through policy solutions that radically limit the choices 
of both national governments and the public. So voters in countries like Italy and Greece can 
change governments, but they cannot change the policies: economic decision-making is de 
facto removed from electoral politics. While this strategy promises more stable institutional 
frameworks, it risks provoking unpredicted reactions. The primacy of politics is at the very 
heart of the European project. What Europeans learned in 1920s and 1930s is that democracy 
should ‘correct’ the markets in order to secure political and social stability. The current 
policies favoured by European leaders are trying to remake the EU and to deprive politics of 
its central role. The expectations are that the new politics of fiscal discipline will reduce 
political pressure on the EU. But while experts can agree or disagree with the pros and cons 
of the austerity policy package, what is more important is that the failure of rigidity will 
automatically accelerate the crisis, and thus make the survival of the Union more difficult. It 
is now clear that the EU cannot survive with a common currency not supported by a 
common treasury. But could it survive as a union of austerity states where the economic 
decision-making is taken out of electoral politics and where identity politics is all that is left 
in politics? The popular response to ‘there is no alternative’ can readily become ‘any 
alternative is better’. 
So what European leaders can learn from the Soviet collapse is that to survive you should get 
your fears right, because as Macbeth remarks after seeing the witches, “Present fears / Are 
less than horrible imaginings.” 
                                                   
14 Catherine Hickley, “Euro Breakup Precedent Seen when 15 State-Ruble Zone Fell Apart”, 
Bloomberg.com, 8 June 2012 (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-07/euro-breakup-
precedent-seen-when-15-state-ruble-zone-fell-apart.html). 
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